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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume XVIII AUTUMN 1968 Number 1
IMPEACHMENT THROUGH PAST CONVICTIONS:
A TIME FOR REFORM
ROBERT G. SPECTOR*
DILEMMA AND INTRODUCTION
ORMERLY an attorney could practice law for a lifetime without
ever having to appear in criminal court. That day is now past.
Due to recent Supreme Court decisions that require practically
all defendants to be represented, an attorney is quite likely to find
himself appointed to represent a criminal defendant, thus practically
all lawyers will soon become familiar with the following dilemma.
A court appointed attorney finds himself representing a defendant
charged with robbing a gas station. The attorney is convinced the man
is innocent and that he will make a good witness. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the man has previously been convicted of robbing a gas station.
Thus the dilemma is posed. Should the defendant take the stand? If he
does, will not that past record come in to bedevil him? Is there not
some way to have the defendant testify and at the same time to keep
that record out? Why should the defendant and his attorney have to
put up with this situation? After all, the defendant is not afraid of in-
criminating himself. Is there really anything that can be done about it?
As every evidence student knows, persons convicted of "infamous
crimes" at one time were prohibited from testifying.' Today the
student rather smugly wonders just how our ancestors could have been
* Mr. Spector is an Assistant Professor of Law at Loyola University School of Law.
He received both his BS. and J.D. from the University of Wisconsin. He is a member
of the Wisconsin Bar.
'"Infamous crimes" is as good a term as any to describe the type of conviction
which disqualified a witness. Nobody was ever positive about what type of criminal
conviction fell into this category. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 373 (1842). Quoted in 2
WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 520 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WismoRJ
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so naive. How silly to believe that a convicted felon was so tainted
that it would be a waste of time for the jury to hear him, since the man
would presumably lie.2 Of course in our "enlightened" world, we allow
practically anyone to testify; we have come to agree with Bentham
that the character of the witness goes to the weight of his testimony
and not to his competency.'
One hundred years from now, will our descendents look back at us
and conclude that we were just as naive in allowing the past convic-
tion of an infamous crime to affect the witness' credibility? Will the
evidence teacher of the twenty-first century explain to his class that
the twentieth century rules of impeachment achieved much the same
result as the nineteenth century rules of competency? In both situa-
tions, persons convicted of infamous crimes rarely took the witness
stand.
The statutes in most states which abolished this testimonial dis-
qualification also provided that persons convicted of infamous crimes
could be impeached by showing their past convictions.' For almost a
century this has presented several problems which have plagued wit-
nesses, especially defendants in criminal cases who wished to testify.
The purpose of this article is to re-examine the basis for allowing past
convictions to be used for impeachment and to discuss attempts to re-
form the process.
2 This disqualification did not appear in English law until the sixteenth century and
did not become solidified until the seventeenth century. There was no need for separate
rules concerning the competency of witnesses until it was finally decided that juries
should render verdicts only on testimony sworn in court and not based on their own
prior knowledge. Indeed, until that time there was really no need for any detailed rules
of evidence. See 9 HOLSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLrsH LAW 177-97 (1926).
3 "Take homicide in the way of duelling. Two men quarrel; one of them calls the other
a liar. So highly does he prize the reputation of veracity, that, rather than suffer a stain
to remain upon it, he determines to risk his life, challenges his adversary to fight, and
kills him. Jurisprudence, in its sapience, knowing no difference between homicide by
consent, by which no other human being is put in fear-and homicide in pursuit of a
scheme of highway robbery, of nocturnal housebreaking, by which every man who has
a life is put in fear of it,-has made the one and the other murder, and consequently
felony. The man prefers death to the imputation of a lie,--and the inference of the law
is, that he cannot open his mouth but lies will issue from it. Such are the inconsistencies
which are unavoidable in the application of any rule which takes improbity for a ground
of exclusion." 7 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Bowrings' ed. 1827).
Quoted in 2 WIGMORE § 519 at 610. There is occasional interest in reviving perjury con-
victions as testimonial disqualifications. Note, The Effect of Perjury on Credibility of
Witnesses in New York, 31 FORD. L. Rv. 797 (1963).
4 McCoRiMcI, EvmEcN § 43 (3d ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as MCCORNacK]. The
ban was removed in England in civil cases in 1843. See An Act for Improving the Law
of Evidence, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 85 (1843).
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THE PROBLEM
The theory behind introducing evidence of past convictions to show
the witness' credibility was stated by Justice Holmes:
[Wihen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only
ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness to
do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general
disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular
case, and thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove
that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself and it reaches that
conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character and
unworthy of credit.5
Granted that in an adversary system it is proper to attempt to show
that the opponent's witnesses are unworthy of belief, the question
still remains whether it is proper to use past convictions for that pur-
pose, especially with regard to a defendant-witness in a criminal pros-
ecution. It is generally recognized' that the use of past convictions in
a criminal trial raises three distinct problems.7 First is the relevancy
problem, particularly regarding the undue prejudice which the prior
conviction may raise with the jury. Second is the so-called "chilling"
factor.8 How often do innocent defendants refuse to take the stand
for the express purpose of not allowing the prosecutor to introduce
their criminal records?9 Third might be called the "associational"
affect. Often a defendant is in the position where his only witnesses
are people with criminal records. The question then arises whether it is
5 Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). See also State v. Duke, 100 N.H.
292, 293, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956), "What a person is often determines whether he
should be believed. . . . No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be in-
formed what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In transactions of everyday
life this is probably the first thing that they would wish to know."
6 Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1940); Note,
Impeaching the Accused by His Prior Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem,
19 HASTINGs L. REv. 919 (1968); Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal De-
fendant-A Reevaluation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Ex-
cluding Evidence of Propensity to Commit Crime, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 426 (1964); Com-
ment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J.
763 (1961).
7 This article does not deal with the use of other offenses as part of the prosecutor's
case-in-chief. It deals only with the impeachment process. Hence when the text dis-
cusses using past convictions it does so in that context.
8 Note, Impeaching the Accused, supra note 6, at 924.
9 It is, of course, axiomatic that the prosecutor cannot attack the character of the
defendant unless the defendant takes the stand. E. CLRY, HANDBOOK OF ILLiNOiS Evi-
DENcE § 12.6, at 210 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CLEARY].
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possible that the jury will automatically discount defendant's witnesses
by identifying the defendant with the witnesses' past criminal records.
THE RELEVANCY PROBLEM
In order for any evidence to be introduced there must be some logical
connection between it and that which it is intended to prove. It does
not matter whether several inferences are necessary to arrive at the
desired end.'0 It is highly questionable, whether the logical relation-
ship exists between all past convictions of infamous crimes" and what
it is offered to prove; namely, that the defendant-witness is not a man
who ought to be believed. The relationship between assault and bat-
tery and armed robbery to truth-telling seems to be tenuous at best.12
However, the logical (or illogical) connection seems to be too well
established to be disturbed.
A logical connection is not the only element of relevancy. An item
of evidence may tend to prove what it is offered to prove but may still
be rejected. Its probative value may be exceedingly low, or it may be
accompanied by other considerations which militate against receiving
the evidence. It may tend to raise too many collateral issues and con-
fuse the jury; it may be too time consuming, or it may be too prejudi-
cial. It is the duty of the trial judge to weigh these counter-factors
against the probative value of the evidence in deciding whether to
admit or exclude.
The obvious counter-factor involved in using past convictions to im-
peach witnesses is prejudice. This prejudice operates in two ways. The
first and obvious prejudicial aspect is the possibility that the jury
will convict the defendant on the basis of his past record, rather than
on the basis of evidence of guilt or innocence. The jury's reasoning is
generally that the defendant is a bad man; whether he is guilty or in-
nocent of the crime charged, he ought to be "put away." The American
10 James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941). "If
the proposition . . . forms a further link in a chain of proof the final proposition of
which is provable in the case at bar, then the offered item of evidence has probative
value in the case."
11 This is the Illinois standard. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 155-1 (1967).
12 On the other hand there does seem to be a logical connection between misdemeanors
involving false-swearing and truth-telling, although misdemeanors are generally not
admissible for impeachment purposes. McCoRMICK § 42, at 87.
13 UN3FORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 45 (1945); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, RULE 303
(1942).
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Jury,4 a study of the jury system, seems to lend scientific support to
what common sense tells us would happen. The study divided defen-
dants into two classes. The charge and all evidence was kept constant.
The only difference was that in one class, evidence of the defendant's
past conviction was used for impeachment. When these past convic-
tions were used, the rate of conviction increased twenty-seven percent.' 5
While admitting that this type of prejudice occurs, the practice is
condoned on two grounds; first, that the jury is entitled to consider
evidence relating to the credibility of the witness, and second, that
the jury is instructed not to use the evidence in determining whether
the defendant is guilty, but to use it only to determine his credibility.
As to the first ground it is well settled that the jury is not entitled to
hear all types of evidence concerning the defendant's character. 6 The
validity of the second as a rationale depends on the validity of judge's
instructions in general. The debate about how effective these instruc-
tions are is too well known to repeat here.'
14 KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
15Id. at 160. This has raised some comments concerning whether the defendant may
be receiving a fair trial. See McCormick, Some Highlights of the Uniform Evidence
Rules, 33 TEXAS L. REV. 559 (1955). The constitutionality of the procedure is discussed
in Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Convic-
tion Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness,
37 U. CiNc. L. REV. 168 (1968). The author feels that the conclusions of Kalven &
Zeisel demonstrate that the accused is denied a fair trial in violation of the sixth
amendment's right to an impartial jury. However, the United States' Supreme Court
has refused to recognize that this is so prejudicial as to violate the Constitution. In
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967), the Court said that some prejudicial effect is
acknowledged to "adhere in criminal practice." It also indicated in dicta that when the
defendant has testified and the state seeks to impeach his credibility, it is proper to use
past convictions. Id. at 561. While the process of impeachment under discussion has
many defects, it is doubtful if it is unconstitutional. It is probably merely an outmoded
and archaic method of conducting a trial. The constitutionality of the procedure in
Illinois was challenged and upheld in People v. Robbins, 88 Ill. App. 2d 447, 232 N.E.2d
302 (1967).
16 Most states, for example, do not allow the use of bad acts not the subject of a
conviction. McCoRMiIC, § 42.
17 The limiting instructions have been widely criticized. They have been called "a
mental gymnastic," Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) ; "a judicial
placebo," United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956); "a ritualistic
counsel of psychologically impossible behavior," United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574,
576 (3d Cir. 1960). Most often quoted is a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson
to the effect that: "[T]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion). This view
of judicial instructions recently received additional support from the Supreme Court in
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). "It is not unreasonable to conclude that
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However, the almost complete lack of agreement on how well this
particular instruction operates destroys the main argument for keep-
ing the process in its present form. The prejudice can be overwhelming,
especially when there is no limitation on the type of felony introduced
or its remoteness to the trial.
The jury may also be prejudiced by the type of conviction that is
introduced. A number of defendants have prior convictions for the
same type of offense that is being charged at trial.'8 Thus the jury is
quite likely to infer that because the defendant has committed similar
crimes in the past, it is probable that he committed the crime for
which he is being tried. The prohibition of such evidence is one of the
main pillars of the "Other Crimes" exclusionary rule. 9 If the de-
fendant is charged with armed robbery of a gas station, the prosecution
would be prohibited from introducing defendant's three prior convic-
tions for armed robbery of a gas station by the "Other Crimes" rule.
Yet, if the defendant testifies, the same evidence could be introduced
during cross-examination of the defendant or in rebuttal in order to
show the defendant's poor credibility. That juries will be able to com-
partmentalize their minds and use the evidence only to determine
credibility and not guilt or innocence, has been termed "impossible
even for berobed judges. '20
in many . .. cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard
• . . information. Nevertheless . . . there are some contexts in which the risk that the
jury will not, or cannot, following instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored." Id. at 135. This method of impeachment seems to present one of
those situations where the jury is not able to follow instructions. Tests have disclosed
that jurors have an "almost universal inability and/or unwillingness either to understand
or follow the court's instruction on the use of defendant's prior criminal record for im-
peachment purposes. The jurors almost universally used defendant's record to conclude
that he was a bad man and hence was more likely than not guilty of the crime for
which he was then standing trial." Letter from Dale W. Broeder to the Yale Law
Journal, March 14, 1960, quoted in Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: O
Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 (1961).
18 It has been estimated that about one-third of those persons released from prison
will commit some new offense within five years. Burglary, car thieves, forgers, and
narcotics offenders are the most frequent recidivists. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEmENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
Faz SocIETy at 45 (1967).
19 People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); Comment, Other Crimes,
supra note 6.
2oUnited States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1962).
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THE "CHILLING" EFFECT
The criminal defendant with a record of past convictions is placed
in the position that he is "damned if he does and damned if he doesn't."
If he takes the stand, the prosecutor will bring out his record, which
will prejudice him in the eyes of the jury. If he does not take the stand
and tries to hide his record, the jury will also draw an adverse inference.
No amount of instructions regarding the defendant's privilege not to
take the stand will erase this adverse effect. This is especially true
when it is obvious that the defendant can add something to the testi-
mony that no one else is able to.21
The American Jury22 illustrates this effect. The defendants in the
study were divided into two classes; those with, and those without a
record. Those without a record elected to testify 37 percent more than
those with a record. The study shows a relationship between a prior
record and the willingness of the defendant to testify.2
If the policy of the administration of criminal justice is to arrive at
the truth consonant with full protection to the defendant, this policy
is not being furthered by allowing the defendant to be impeached in
this manner. It appears that the reason many defendants refuse to take
the stand is not because they wish to avoid incriminating themselves,
but because they wish to keep their record from the jury. If this is the
case, it would seem logical that in order to present the trier of fact with
the most complete evidence possible, it would be better to abolish or
modify the impeachment process.24
THE "ASSOCIATIONAL" EFFECT
The type of prejudice under this heading does not directly affect
the defendant, but its indirect effect could be quite prejudicial. The de-
fendant's witnesses are subject, of course, to the same method of
impeachment as the defendant.25 However, the criminal defendant is
21McCormick, § 43, at 94; Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 245 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
22 KALVEN & ZEIZEL, supra note 14, at 146.
23 KALvEN & ZEZEL, supra note 14, at 160-61.
24 Ladd, supra, note 6, at 187.
25 In some states, including Illinois, a witness may be impeached more easily than the
defendant. E.g., People v. Halkens, 386 Ill. 167, 53 N.E.2d 923 (1944) ; State v. Saunders,
14 Ore. 300, 12 P. 441 (1886).
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likely to have witnesses with criminal records. This is especially true
today when it is the rule rather than the exception for a person in an
urban ghetto to have a police record. Thus the defendant not only runs
the risk of having his witnesses disbelieved because of their previous
convictions but is quite likely to be associated in the minds of the
jury with them, as another criminal. The defendant is likely to be con-
demned through guilt by association instead of on evidence of guilt
or innocence. This seems confirmed by the fact that almost one-third
of the appeals in Illinois alleging improper impeachment were cases
where the person impeached was one of the defendant's witnesses and
not the defendant."
It would seem that with all the above factors militating against the
admissibility of impeachment evidence of prior convictions, that some
jurisdictions would have modified or abrogated the process. Yet despite
urging to do so from the commentators,2" the Model Code of Evidence,28
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,2" few jurisdictions have attempted
to modify the process." It seems that the interest by part of the Bar
to keep the rule as it is, and inertia of the rest, has prevented change.3
THE RULE IN ILLINOIS
Illinois, like all other states, has abandoned the old common law
disqualification for witnesses who have been convicted of infamous
crimes. There are separate statutes for criminal and civil cases. The
criminal statute provides:
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any criminal case by reason of
his interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his
having been convicted of any crime; but such interest or conviction may be
shown for the purpose of effecting his credibility.8 2
26 E.g., People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957); People v. Roche, 389
I1. 361, 59 N.E.2d 866 (1945).
27See note 6, supra.
2 8 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 106 (1942).
2 9 UNI ORm RUlE OF EVIDENCE 21 (1953).
8
o Inra note 72.
81 For a study of how legal norms are developed and maintained through the forces
of inertia see HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 28-76 (1960).
82 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (1967). The civil section is practically identical. LL.
REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 1 (1967).
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The statutes form the basis for impeachment by prior conviction in
Illinois. The statutes are both restraining and ineffective. The courts
have read distinctions into the process where none are mentioned in
the statutes. They have refused to allow certain other distinctions on
the ground that they were not mentioned in the statutes.
WHAT CAN BE SHOWN
Only convictions for infamous crimes may be used." The reason
is that under the common law only infamous crimes could disqualify
a witness, and therefore, according to the courts it was these crimes
that the legislature allowed to be used to affect credibility when it
removed the ban. The infamous crimes are set out by statute:
Infamous crimes . . . are the offenses of arson, bigamy, bribery, burglary, deviate
sexual assault, forgery, incest or aggravated incest, indecent liberties with a child,
kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, murder, perjury, rape, robbery, sale of nar-
cotic drugs, subornation of perjury, and theft if the punishment imposed is im-
prisonment in the penitentiary.
3 4
Thus it is improper to use misdemeanor convictions. Arrests or in-
dictments for infamous crimes are also inadmissible. There must have
been a conviction. 5 After some minor confusion it seems that a con-
33 People v. Kirkpatrick, 413 Ill. 595, 110 N.E.2d 519 (1953) ; Bartholomew v. People,
104 Ill. 601 (1882) ; McLain v. City of Chicago, 127 Ill. App. 489 (1906); People v.
Maas, 154 Ill. App. 11 (1910).
34 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 124-1 (1967). Examples of crimes held to be infamous are
larceny by a bailee, Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 33 Ill. 2d 103, 210 N.E.2d
191 (1965); receiving stolen property, People v. Fitzgibbons, 346 Ill. 338, 179 N.E. 106
(1931) ; and rape, Clifford v. Pioneer Fireproofling Co., 232 Ill. 150, 83 N.E. 448 (1907).
Examples of crimes held to be not infamous are disorderly conduct, People v. Beard, 67
Ill. App. 2d 83, 214 N.E.2d 577 (1966); conspiracy to cheat and defraud, Lamkin v.
Burnett, 7 Ill. App. 143 (1880); and making false and fraudulent schedule of taxable
property, Matzenbaugh v. People, 194 Ill. 108, 62 N.E. 546 (1901). It should be noted
that the last two convictions mentioned are much more closely related to truth-telling
and veracity and yet they are excluded. The same cannot be said for rape and yet it is
admitted. If the conviction is from another jurisdiction the court will admit it if it is
similar to one of the infamous crimes mentioned in the statute. A conviction of breaking
and entering in Iowa is similar to the Illinois crime of burglary, People v. Trent, 85 Ill.
App. 2d 157, 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967); a conviction of grand larceny in Michigan is the
same as a conviction for grand larceny in Illinois even though the punishment is lighter
in Michigan, People v. Witherspoon, 27 Ill. 2d 483, 190 N.E.2d 281 (1963). However, a
Federal conviction for violation of the Dyer Act is not comparable to any Illinois in-
famous crime and cannot be admitted. People v. Kirkpatrick, 413 Ill. 595, 110 N.E.2d
519 (1953).
35 People v. Green, 292 Ill. 351, 127 N.E. 50 (1920) ; People v. Gore, 64 II. App. 2d
309, 211 N.E.2d 757 (1965). Arrests and indictments can, of course, be admitted when
the purpose of the impeachment is not to show bad character but to show that defendant
1968]
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viction obtained on a plea of guilty rather than by trial is permissible. 8
This approach is a considerable improvement over the practice pre-
vailing in other states which permit convictions of all crimes to be
introduced.
THE PROCESS OF PROOF
Here the most important distinction is between a witness in either
a civil or criminal action and the defendant in a criminal action, a
distinction not mentioned in the statutes. A witness may be impeached
either through cross-examination concerning previous convictions of
infamous crimes or through the introduction of the record of convic-
tion. T He may be cross-examined only about convictions88 and the
cross examiner should not inquire into details of the arrest, indictment,
trial or punishment."9
Until recently the process was quite different when a criminal de-
fendant was involved. For a time it was definite that a defendant in a
criminal case could be impeached only by introducing the record of
conviction. ° He could not be cross-examined with regard to those
convictions on the ground that it was too highly prejudicial. However,
through an ingenious twisting of phrases the Supreme Court reversed
itself without acknowledging that it was doing so.
In People v. Baker,4' a Court's witness was asked by the state's at-
is biased, People v. Mason, 28 Ill. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 835 (1963); or to contradict
witness' testimony on direct examination that he had never been arrested, People v.
Snell, 74 Ill. App. 2d 12, 219 N.E.2d 554 (1966); People v. Ficke, 343 InI. 367, 175 N.E.
543 (1931).
86 Conviction on plea of guilty held inadmissible in People v. Maas, 154 Ill. App. 11
(1910), held admissible in People v. Wolfe, 73 Ill. App. 2d 274, N.E.2d 634 (1966).
In neither case does the court cite authority or attempt to rationalize the conclusion. It
would seem to be logical to admit such convictions since ninety-eight percent of criminal
convictions are obtained on pleas of guilty. See NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETER-
MINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
87 People v. Halkens, 386 IMI. 167, 53 N.E.2d 923 (1944).
88People v. Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 100 N.E.2d 607 (1951).
89 People v. Hoffmann, 399 Ill. 57, 77 N.E.2d 195 (1948). A witness in a civil case
can be cross-examined in the same way as a witness in a criminal case. In a civil case no
distinction is made between a party and a witness. A habeas corpus proceeding is re-
garded as a civil case, People ex rel. Borelli v. Lohman, 13 Ill. 2d 506, N.E.2d 116
(1958); so is a bastardy proceeding, People ex rel. Hewes v. Michael, 189 InI. App. 49S
(1914).
40 E.g., People v. Bennett, 413 Ill. 601, 110 N.E.2d 175 (1953) ; People v. Kosearas, 408
I1. 179, 96 N.E.2d 539 (1951).
418 111. 2d 522, 134 N.E.2d 786 (1956).
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torney whether he had ever been convicted of the infamous crime of
robbery. The Supreme Court correctly refused to consider such a
question error, and said: "While defendant may be impeached on the
ground of his prior conviction of other infamous crimes only by intro-
duction of the records of such prior convictions, a witness, not the
defendant may be cross-examined as to his prior convictions of other
infamous crimes.
42
Then in People v. Neukom, 43 the court pulled out its semantic
rabbit. The defendant was convicted of robbery and alleged that the
court committed error in allowing the state's attorney to ask him on
cross-examination whether he had been convicted of previous infamous
crimes. After cross-examination, in rebuttal, the state introduced the
records of defendant's past convictions. The Supreme Court surpris-
ingly affirmed and cited Baker for the proposition that error is com-
mitted when the state cross-examines the defendant about the previous
crimes and does not introduce the record. The court held that intro-
ducing the record after cross-examination cures the error.4 This is
quite different from the Baker dictum that the accused could only be
impeached by the introduction of the record. 5 This has led to some
confusion in the appellate districts. Some of the appellate courts have
applied the Neukom decision and have attempted to determine how
much cross-examination is possible, while other courts have acted as
if the Neukom case did not exist.
The Second District in People v. Smith46 has attempted to handle
the problem. The trial court had permitted the state's attorney to
cross-examine the witness about his past convictions. Then on rebuttal
the prosecution produced the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Winnebago
County who testified as to the records of defendant's past convictions.
The court upheld this method of producing the record and then went
on to discuss the cross-examination.
[W]e are not condoning the practice ... of examining the defendant as to such
convictions any more than we believe the Supreme Court ...was indicating ap-
proval of such practice . . . . It is conceivable that the examination of the
defendant as to his prior conviction, in extremely close cases or in those in which
421d. at 525-26, 134 N.E.2d at 788 (emphasis added).
43 16 IMI. 2d 340, 158 N.E.2d 53 (1959).
44 Id. at 348, 158 N.E.2d at 57.
45 The Supreme Court followed Neukom in People v. Squires, 27 IM. 2d 518, 190 N.E.2d
361 (1963).
4663 IlM. App. 2d 369, 211 N.E.2d 456 (1965).
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the nature of the offense elicited is revolting or heinous, may result in more
than merely discrediting his testimony, and that the examination in such cases
may constitute prejudicial error and grounds for reversal. In such case the error
could not be cured by subsequently proving the conviction in the proper manner.47
In People v. Rojas,4" the same district held that it is not in error to
impeach the defendant by both cross-examination and by producing
the record. But it noted that in order to encourage the defendant to
take the stand and because of the possibility of the cross-examination
creating prejudice, "the accepted procedure of introducing the record
only should be followed."49
At the same time in the Fifth District in People v. Ring,5 ° the
defendant had been asked on cross-examination, "Have you ever been
convicted of a felony?" Although an objection to the question was
sustained the court still reversed the conviction. The court first stated
that the only proper way to impeach the defendant was by the record.
Then it stated:
The question ... could have been very influential on the jurors. Although the
objection was sustained, the objection could only indicate to the jurors that the
reason for the objection was that the answer would be in the affirmative ...
We believe that the question asked was reversible error that might have affected
the jury's decision.5'
The court cited neither the Supreme Court case nor the Second Dis-
trict cases on the point.
The commentators which have written on the subject since the
Neukom case still assert that the only proper method of impeaching
the defendant through the use of past convictions, is by introducing
the record."2 It seems that what has developed is not a change in the
rule regulating the impeachment process but a change in what con-
47 Id. at 381-82, 211 N.E.2d at 461.
48 68 Ill. App. 2d 171, 215 N.E.2d 140 (1966).
49d. at 175, 215 N.E.2d at 142.
50 89 Ill. App. 2d 161, 232 N.E.2d 23 (1967).
51 Id. at 167, 232 N.E.2d at 26.
52 CLEARY, § 9.5 at 139; GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL, rule 478 at 605 (1963).
The Supreme Court in People v. McCrimmon, 37 Ill. 2d 40, 224 N.E.2d 822 (1967),
cert. denied 389 U.S. 863 (1967), noted that in Neukom and Squires it had not intended
to approve a double method of impeachment. It disapproved attempts to impeach the
defendant through both cross-examination and through the introduction of the record
of conviction. Yet it still seemed to indicate that the error of cross-examining the witness
about his past convictions could be corrected through the introduction of the record.
Thus while disapproving the double method the court did not seem to be changing
anything.
[Vol. XVIII: 1
1968] IMPEACHMENT THROUGH PAST CONVICTIONS
stitutes reversible error. The Supreme Court has decided that not
every violation of the rule will require reversal. The Fifth District
appears to have rejected this while the Second District has evolved
a balancing test to determine what is reversible error. The balancing
test used by the Second District is a start in the right direction. How-
ever, it seems the court is applying the test in the wrong place in the
proceedings. It could best be used to determine whether prior convic-
tions should be admissible at all, not as to when they would cause a
reversal. Probably the question of whether cross examining a defendant
on his past convictions is error or reversible error is a mere quibble;
if the cross-examination will not result in a reversal, then perhaps it
is not really error at all.
The conviction is usually proved by having the state introduce the
record or a certified copy of it.5" The conviction must have been before
a competent tribunal,54 and proof of the conviction need not be beyond
a reasonable doubt. 5 The actual guilt or innocence of the defendant
in the prior conviction is immaterial.5 Also immaterial is the fact that
the defendant has been pardoned,57 or his sentence commuted or sus-
pended.5" The conviction may be used even though it is now pending
on appeal.59 In one case the conviction was later reversed. 0 Only if
53 People v. Flynn, 8 Il. 2d 116, 133 N.E.2d 257 (1956); People v. Dougherty, 266
11. 420, 107 N.E. 695 (1914). It is also proper to produce the circuit court clerk to
testify as to the fact that the record exists, People v. Smith, 63 Ill. App. 2d 369, 211
N.E.2d 456 (1966). If the record is lost, a judge's affidavit will be sufficient, People v.
Rowland, 36 Ill. 2d 311, 223 N.E.2d 113 (1967). It is possible that if the record does
not show that the accused was represented by counsel that it cannot be introduced on
constitutional grounds. Cf. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), where the Court said
that a conviction that did not show on its face that the defendant was represented by
counsel could not be used as the basis for a habitual offender conviction. The Court
went on to say that such convictions could not be used against the defendant "for any
purpose. . . ." Id. at 115.
54 People v. Kosearas, 408 Ill. 179, 96 N.E.2d 539 (1951).
55 People v. Buford, 396 Ill. 158, 71 N.E.2d 340 (1947).
56 Gallagher v. People, 211 Ill. 158, 71 N.E. 842 (1904), error dismissed, 203 U.S. 600.
The defendant may, however, say a few words in extenuation of the conviction, Freeman
v. Chicago Transit Authority, 50 Ill. App. 2d 125, 200 N.E.2d 128 (1964).
57 People v. Andrae, 295 Ill. 445, 129 N.E. 178 (1920). However, the defendant may
show his pardon to mitigate the effect of the prior conviction on the jury. O'Donnell
v. People, 110 Ill. App. 250 (1903).
5 People v. Spears, 83 Ill. App. 2d 18, 226 N.E.2d 67 (1967).
59 Id.; People v. Webb, 80 Ill. App. 2d 445, 225 N.E.2d 679 (1967); People v. Scott,
89 Ill. App. 2d 413, 232 N.E.2d 478 (1967) ; People v. Ledford, 94 Ill. App. 2d 74, 236
N.E.2d 19 (1968). This particular aspect of the process has been described as "illogical
and unfair." Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1949), which held
contra.
6
o People v. Barney, 89 Ill. App. 2d 180, 232 N.E.2d 481 (1967).
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the prior conviction is held to be a complete nullity will it be kept out."'
In addition, the remoteness of the conviction from the trial will not
affect its admissibility. 2 Thus a twenty-six year old conviction of a
crime against nature is admissible,63 as is a twenty year old burglary
conviction.64
Although the process in Illinois is somewhat more favorable to
the defendant than in many states, it still presents considerable prob-
lems. The courts have not been entirely consistent, especially in their
interpretation of the statutes. They have distinguished between de-
fendants and witnesses although such a distinction is not mentioned
in the statutes. They have refused to allow the remoteness of the con-
viction to affect its admissibility on the ground that remoteness is not
mentioned in the statutes. Dissatisfaction with the present situation
is clearly evidenced by the number of appeals on this question within
the past eighteen months.6 5 The attitude of the Illinois courts seems
to be quite similar to that expressed by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals:
No good purpose could be served in discussing the defendant's contention that the
court erred in permitting the impeachment of defendant by showing he had been
convicted of a felony eleven years previously. On numerous occasions we have
heard the argument that such evidence is unfair to a defendant and in some cases
works a great hardship. We have sympathy with the argument but even so, we
do not feel disposed to abruptly strike down a rule so long embedded in the
law.66
THE REMEDIES
THE UNIFORM RULES
The Uniform Rules6 7 approach is directed to remedy those aspects
of the system that produce the most hardship. Rule 21 provides that
61 People v. Shook, 35 Ill. 2d 597, 221 N.E.2d 290 (1966).
2 People v. Buford, supra note 55; People v. Brown, 69 Ill. App. 2d 212, 215 N.E.2d
812 (1966).
6 8 People v. Smith, 90 IM. App. 2d 310, 234 N.E.2d 31 (1967).
64 People v. Somerville, 88 Ill. App. 2d 134, 231 N.E.2d 701 (1967) (abstract only
published).
65 There have been over fifteen such appeals.
66 United States v. Plata, 361 F.2d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S.
841 (1966). It seems appropriate to quote Holmes at this point to the effect that, "Every
one instinctively recognizes that in these days the justification of a law for us cannot
be found in the fact that our fathers have always followed it." HoLMEs, Law in Science
and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PaERS 225 (Laski ed. 1921), quoted in HURST,
JUSTiCE HOLmES ON LEGAL HISTORY 106 (1964).
67 UNuoRM RULE OF EvDEscE 21: "Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a
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only those criminal convictions showing a lack of truth and veracity
can be introduced. The Rule further states that a defendant-witness
cannot be impeached by proving past convictions unless the defendant
has offered evidence of his good character. The defendant is not deemed
to have offered such evidence merely by taking the stand.
It is questionable whether the limitation of the Uniform Rules to
convictions involving a lack of truth and veracity is very helpful. While
it is an improvement over a standard that would allow convictions of
"all crimes" or "infamous crimes"6 to be introduced, it still does not
solve the entire relevancy problem. The logical connection between
convictions involving a lack of truth and veracity and the willingness
of a defendant to lie is present; and, it is arguable the connection is
not present in a conviction involving, for example, assault and battery.
However, the probative value of such convictions is not much higher.6"
The jury hardly needs such evidence when it is obvious that any de-
fendant is vitally interested in the outcome of his own case. A past
criminal record involving crimes of deceit "does not tell any more
about the accused's willingness to lie when faced with punishment
than does a record containing other kinds of crimes."70 In addition to
not increasing the probative value of the evidence, the Uniform Rule
does nothing to ameliorate most of the prejudices. The jury is still as
likely to convict the defendant because he is a "bad man" as it would
before. The only improvement the Uniform Rule does make is that
of limiting the type of conviction that can be introduced. The Rule
also limits the number of convictions that can be used. Thus if the
defendant has been lucky enough never to have been convicted of
"lying" crimes, he will be much better off. The one escape for tradi-
tionalists under the Uniform Rule is just what the courts will determine
crime not involving dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose
of impairing his credibility. If the witness be the accused in a criminal proceeding, no
evidence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole purpose of impairing
his credibility unless he has first introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose
of supporting his credibility." The section is patterned after MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE,
rule 106, which has been characterized as "the most valuable recommendation made in
the code. . . ." Goodhart, A Changing Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 VA. L. REV.
759, 778 (1965).
68 See McCoRmIcx, § 43, at 90 for the variety of tests used in different jurisdictions.
69 As one commentator put it: "At best . . . [they] do no more than negative the
possible assumption of some jurors that the particular witness could not lie with a
straight face." Comment, Other Crimes, supra note 6, at 778.
70 Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Evidence, 24 IowA L. Rav. 498, 532-35
(1939).
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to be crimes involving dishonesty or false swearing. It would decimate
the rule if the courts held that all crimes involving a mens rea quali-
fied.
The other aspect of the Uniform Rule reform would limit the use
of past convictions to impeach the defendant to those cases where he
has expressly put his character in issue. The distinction between a
defendant and an ordinary witness is relatively innovative, although
some states do recognize it in prescribing one method of impeachment
for a defendant and one for an ordinary witness. 1 Few, however, have
applied the distinction in the way prescribed by the Uniform Rules.72
The reform is salutory and serves to correct one of the main prob-
lems in the use of prior convictions. Under this ruling a defendant
could take the stand and the jury would be allowed to hear his story
without the defendant worrying about the introduction of his past
record. This would especially help the innocent defendant who is
afraid to take the stand because of his past record. 3 The reform, how-
ever, stands little chance of being adopted. Statutes stand in the way
in most states and even a strained interpretation of them could hardly
produce a situation comparable to the Uniform Rule 4.7  In addition,
both California and New Jersey, which have adopted the Uniform
Rules, have done so without Uniform Rule 21.
THE LUCK APPROACH
The District of Columbia circuit has attempted to handle the process
by an evaluation of the type of conviction used with regard to its pro-
bative value and its counter-factors. It has evolved a balancing test
71 See the discussion of the procedure followed in Illinois, supra notes 37-39, text and
notes.
72 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (1963). This procedure is practically identical to that
prevailing in England. Criminal Evidence Act, 61 & 62 Vict. ch. 36, § 1(f) (1898) ;CROSS,
EVIDENCE 334-56 (2d ed. 1963) ; Stone, Cross-Examination by the Prosecution at Common
Law and under the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 51 L.Q. REV. 443 (1935); Stone,
Further Problems in the Interpretation of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, s. 1,
proviso(f), 58 L.Q. REv. 369 (1942).
73 H. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 121, 163 (1932), gives examples of in-
nocent defendants who refused to testify because of their past record. See also J. FRANK,
NOT GUILTY, 106-07 (1957).
74 See the Illinois statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (1967).
75 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21 was recommended by the Commissioners in both
states and rejected by the legislatures. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COaMi'N, 7 REPORTS:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS, 14-44 (1965); 1963 REPORT OF THE N.J. Sup. CT.
COMM'N ON EVIDENCE 66-68.
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that determines on the basis of the facts of each case whether certain
convictions should or should not be admitted.
The balancing process had its genesis in Luck v. United States.76
Luck was convicted of housebreaking and larceny. He claimed he had
an alibi and so testified at trial. Over objection, the government was
allowed to cross-examine the defendant concerning a past conviction
for grand larceny. This ruling was assigned as error. The court re-
versed the conviction on other grounds, but felt compelled to discuss
the impeachment problem.
The District of Columbia has a statute,77 practically identical to the
Illinois statute, which abolished the common law testimonial disquali-
fication for convicted felons but provided that such conviction may be
shown to affect credibility. The court focused on the word "may" in
the statute and said that this left room for judicial discretion in deter-
mining whether past convictions should be admitted. The government
had contended that under the statute the court must admit such evi-
dence. The Court, however, recognized that there would be cases where
the admission of evidence would run counter to the philosophy of
criminal justice. "There may well be cases where the trial judge believes
the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs probative relevance
of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. ' 78 In deciding whether
to admit the evidence, the court said that the trial judge should consider
"the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, the
age and circumstances of the defendant, and, above all, the extent to
which it is important to the search for truth in a particular case for
the jury to hear the defendant's story than to know of a prior convic-
tion."79
76 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
77 14 D.C. Code Ann., § 14-305 (1966).
78 Supra note 76, at 768. The court is clearly adopting the rationale of UNIFORM RUL
oF EviDENCE 45, which provides: "Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge
may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the risk that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time, or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or
of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered." This reasoning
process applies to all evidence. Thus the trial judge should always balance the probative
value of the evidence against its counter-factors. This is so even if the evidence is tech-
nically admissible under some evidence ruling.
79 Id. at 769. While the approach in the opinion was dictum, the court in later cases
referred to Luck as indicating what the rule in the District of Columbia was. Hood v.
United States, 365 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court also felt that the Luck approach
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The Luck approach became firmly imbedded in the District of
Columbia jurisprudence in the case of Brown v. United States.80 Here
for the first time the court reversed a lower court judge on the ground
that he had improperly exercised his discretion. The lower court had
admitted a two-year old conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
The trial judge did not base his decision on the factors mentioned in
Luck but rather on an "abstract belief that those with prior convictions
are likely to commit perjury."'" The court reversed, saying:
As is obvious, should such an abstraction be permitted to prevail Luck would be
rendered meaningless; if we accept the view that prior convictions provided such
an impetus to commit perjury as to outweigh any prejudicial effect of impeach-
ment, then we will have returned to the automatic impeachment rule Luck sought
to change.8 2
The court stressed the extreme prejudicial nature of the past con-
viction, noting that the conviction was of the same type of crime that
the defendant was then being tried for. The court also felt it was
important for the jury to hear the defendant's testimony.
Due to some confusion about what the standards set out in Luck and
Brown meant, 8 the court in Gordon v. United States8 4 elaborated
those elements that the trial judge should consider in deciding whether
to admit or exclude past convictions. The court approved the trial
court's admission of three past convictions on the grounds that it had
validly exercised its discretion and the appellate court would not, there-
fore, upset it. The court then articulated what the trial court should
consider.
1. The type of crime. In considering what convictions can be used, the
court said that those involving acts of violence had little or no relation-
ship to veracity. On the other hand, perjury, fraud, and cheating do
have such a relationship. "A 'rule of thumb' thus should be that convic-
tions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas
removed any possible constitutional objections to this method of impeachment. Trimble
v. United States, 369 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
80370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
8 ld. at 244.
82 ld.
88 See Stevens v. United States, 370 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Jackson v. United
States, 232 A.2d 576 (D.C. App. 1967).
84 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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those of violence or assaultive crimes do not; traffic violations how-
ever serious, are in the same category."8 5
2. Time of conviction. The remoteness or nearness of the prior convic-
tion to the trial affects both its probative value and its prejudicial
effect.80
3. Subsequent history of the defendant. Has the accused led a legally
blameless life since the past conviction?"' If the accused has not been
convicted of any crimes since the past conviction then the previous
conviction loses much of its probative value. This is especially true
when the time interval has been several years. This is, of course, closely
related to the second consideration.
4. The similarity between the past crime and the one for which defen-
dant is on trial. "As a general guide, those convictions for the same
crime should be admitted sparingly; one solution might well be that
discretion be exercised to limit impeachment by way of a similar crime
to a single conviction and then only when the circumstances indicate
strong reasons for disclosure, and where the conviction directly relates
to veracity."88 The greater the degree of similarity between the past
crime and the present crime the greater the prejudice that is involved.
Thus, as the degree of similarity increases, the court should be more
willing to exclude the prior conviction.
5. Importance of defendant's testimony. How important is it for the
jury to hear the defendant testify? It becomes especially acute in cases
where the defendant is claiming alibi, or innocent possession of stolen
goods.8
6. The posture of the case. How great is the need for character testi-
mony? In a situation where the case turns on the credibility of two
opposing witnesses, the need for impeachment testimony may well be
higher.
The court also recommended a procedure for the trial court to deter-
mine those preliminary facts necessary for it to exercise its discretion.
"The best way for the district judge to evaluate the situation is to have
85d at 940.
86 Id. There are some jurisdictions where the remoteness of the conviction will affect
its admissibility. E.g., Sibley v. Jeffers, 76 Ariz. 340, 264 P.2d 831 (1953); Chandler v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. 41, 229 S.W.2d 71 (1950).
87 d.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 941.
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the accused take the stand in a non-jury hearing and elicit his testimony
and allow cross-examination before resolving the Luck issue." 9° The
burden of presenting the court with enough evidence for the trial
judge to exercise his discretion is the defendant's. 1 Absent a clear
invoking of the judge's discretion, there can be no error. 2 Once the
court thus exercises its discretion, the appellate court will not reverse
except for abuse.9"
The Luck approach has passed almost unnoticed. While there have
been a number of cases in the District of Columbia refining the doctrine,
there are still a number of District of Columbia judges who are unfamil-
iar with the decision.94 The doctrine has not been debated in many
other jurisdictions, and where it has, it has not made much headway.
The ruling has been rejected explicitly in New Jersey,9" a state with a
statute almost identical to that of the District of Columbia, and in
California. It appears at first glance that it has also been rejected in
New Hampshire in State v. Cote.9 7 Although that court affirmed its
earlier opinion in State v. Duke,9 that all convictions of crimes are
admissible to impeach a testifying defendant, it did say that cross-ex-
amination of the defendant should be controlled by the trial judge.
It cited Luck to the effect that prior convictions are admitted only
when their probative value outweighs the prejudice involved in intro-
ducing such convictions. The implication is that if the trial judge
thought the balance lay in the opposite direction, he might exclude
or restrict cross-examination. The Luck approach has also been ap-
90 Id.
91 Id. This is exactly opposite from the reform proposed in New Jersey. 1963 REPORT
OF THE N.J. Sup. CT. COMM'N ON EVIDENCE 66. As noted previously the reform was not
adopted.
92 Hood v. United States, 365 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Burroughs v. United States,
236 A.2d 319 (D.C. App. 1967); Conyers v. United States, 237 A.2d 838 (D.C. App.
1968).
931 Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; Laughlin v. United States,
385 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
9 4 E.g., Barber v. United States, 392 F.2d 517, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1968), "The trial court
seemed somewhat unfamiliar with the Luck line of decisions.
95 State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 682 (1967).
906 People v. Kelly, - Cal. App. 2d -, 68 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1968).
97 235 A.2d 111 (N.H. 1967).
98 100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956).
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proved in dicta by the Fourth Circuit,9 and by one of the judges of
the Supreme Court of Idaho.' °
The Luck approach has many desirable attributes. It meets rather
effectively the problem of undue prejudice toward the defendant. The
trial court can effectively limit the use of past convictions so as to pre-
vent the jury from being overwhelmed by the defendant's record. Also
the trial judge is able to exclude such evidence entirely if he feels that
the jury will be benefited more by hearing the defendant's testimony
than by hearing defendant's record. However, in solving one problem,
the District of Columbia circuit has, in effect, created another. The
procedure for determining the admissibility of the past convictions is
for the trial judge to hold a hearing out of the presence of the jury.
While this is an effective method of determining whether the convictions
would be too prejudicial to admit, it does take a great deal of time. In
one case it was noted that this hearing took a day and a half to com-
plete.1" 1 With the backlog of jury trials reaching incredible proportions,
even in criminal cases, this additional delay would hardly seem justi-
fied. The Court recognized the problem in Gordon. "Surely it would
be much simpler if prior convictions of an accused were totally ad-
missible or totally excludable as impeachment."'0 2 However, faced
with the statute that allows past convictions to be used, the court
felt that it had no choice in adding to the burden of trial judges. The
administration of criminal justice is better served by having a longer
delay than by indiscriminate use of past convictions.
The Luck approach has also been criticized on the grounds that it
will provide irreconcilable results at the trial level and that it will deluge
the appellate courts with appeals.0 3 This seems to be a specious argu-
ment. Historically, many evidenciary decisions have been left to the
trial judge's discretion and the trend of reform in evidence is to leave
99 United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1967) cites both Brown and Luck
with approval.
100 State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 879, 434 P.2d 88, 96 (1967) (concurring opinion of
Spear, J., suggesting that when the proper case presents itself the court should consider
construing the Idaho statute as the District of Columbia has construed its statute).
101 Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
102 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
103 State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 228 A.2d 683, 688 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., con-
curring).
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even more decisions to his discretion. Although in some areas, such
as the trial judge's control over the scope of cross-examination, the
number of appeals have increased, the number of appeals arising from
this impeachment process is already large. It seems doubtful that
adopting the Luck approach will increase such appeals. Indeed the
appeals in the District of Columbia seem to have tapered off with that
court's announcement that once the trial judge's discretion has been
meaningfully exercised, it will be extremely hesitant in reversing that
discretion. It is possible that the Luck approach will not lend itself
to uniform application, but even so, it is preferable to have such a
flexible approach rather than a set rule which cannot help but be
arbitrary in some cases. Indeed it appears as though the whole trend of
recent developments in criminal procedure has been towards individu-
alizing the administration of criminal justice. 04
ABOLITION
Perhaps the most effective answer to the problem would be to com-
pletely abolish this method of impeachment. The method has many
faults, and few have had a good word to say in its behalf. It does not
accomplish its avowed purpose (i.e., to test the credibility of the wit-
ness); and its side effects of prejudicially arousing the jury and keeping
the defendant off the stand should alone be enough to condemn it. In
addition, it is at odds with other aspects of evidence law."0 5 Impeaching
the defendant through his past convictions is impeachment through a
single act. The jury is asked to base a determination of the defendant-
witness' credibility on one incident, rather than on a series of incidents.
Thus, while it would be useful for the jury to know how many times
and under what circumstances the defendant has lied in the past, this
is clearly forbidden. Past bad acts not the subject of a conviction are
usually not admissible as impeachment, no matter how logically rele-
vant they are.'08 The defendant in bolstering his good character is
not entitled to show specific instances of good deeds or occasions when
he was particularly truthful. He is limited generally to evidence of
his reputation for truthfulness and veracity.0 7
104 Cf. Note, Individualized Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Study of Dis-
positional Decision Making, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1260 (1968).
105 For a good discussion of this problem see, Ladd, supra note 6, at 177-78.
106 MCCORMICK, § 42, at 87; CLEARY, § 9.5, at 136.
107 MCCORMICK, § 44, at 94.
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With all these arguments against retaining this process of impeach-
ment, why is it still in use? The most compelling reason for its con-
tinuance is that in most states to abolish the process would require the
legislature to act. As mentioned, the basis of the process is in those stat-
utes which while removing the testimonial disqualification from con-
victed felons, also permit the conviction to be shown to affect credibil-
ity. There seems to be little chance that these statutes will be repealed.
It is always more difficult to repeal a law than to enact one. This is
specifically true when there is no interested group that has a stake in
repeal. Those persons who engage in criminal defense are generally
unorganized and are not generally prominent in organized Bar Associa-
tion activities. On the other hand, those attorneys who engage in crim-
inal prosecution are organized, are influential, and usually work toward
keeping this method of impeachment intact.""8 The rest of the Bar,
especially those not engaged in extensive trial work, are apathetic.
Thus the rule continues from mere inertia.
CONCLUSION
The ameliorative device of limiting instructions has failed to solve
the problem of this type of impeachment. Reform through the codifica-
tion of the Uniform Rules does not seem to be a realistic possibility.
In over fifteen years of its existence, very few jurisdictions have adopted
the Uniform Rules, and two of them have struck out the provisions
relating to this method of impeachment. Abolition also seems unlikely
due to legislative inertia. The Luck approach, for all its problems of
delay, seems to be the most effective means of reform.
The Luck approach, or a variant, should be adopted in Illinois. The
supreme court could do so without any subversion of legislative intent.
It seems relatively clear that those statutes which permit a witness to
be impeached by showing his past convictions do not intend to regulate
the mechanics of the process. The intent is merely to remove the testi-
108 It has been asserted that many prosecutors actually use past convictions in the
hope that jurors will consider it as evidence of guilt and not as merely affecting de-
fendant's credibility. They depend on the jury not being able to follow the judge's
instructions. Hoffman & Bradley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rav. 235, 245 (1952). In
California the Attorney General and other law enforcement agencies played a large part
in deleting Uniform Rule 21 from their recent evidence revision. McDONOUGH, THE
CAioRsA EviDFxCE CoDE: A Pacss 89, 105 (1967).
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monial disability of convicted felons.10 9 The courts seem to have recog-
nized this without actually articulating it. The distinction between
witnesses and defendants is not mentioned in the statute.
Certain aspects of the Illinois process should definitely be retained.
Proof by record rather than by cross-examination when a defendant
is the witness should be continued. The court might also give considera-
tion to shifting the burden to the party who intends the impairment.
Thus, unless the party who wishes to introduce the past convictions
convinces the trial court that they should be admitted, such convictions
would be inadmissible.
The situation should be considered by the supreme court at its
earliest opportunity. Most of the reform in criminal procedure has been
at the constitutional level. However, merely because certain aspects of
the criminal trial are constitutional does not mean that they are wise
or just. A certain rule of criminal evidence may be constitutional and
at the same time be unduly prejudicial. The rule allowing a defendant
to be impeached by the use of his past criminal record falls into this
category. It does seem clear that reform is needed. In the words of an
Illinois jurist:
The rule, which has no historical sanctity serves no useful purpose and is dis-
criminatory and unfair and should be abolished. Its retention in this day of
supposedly enlightened jurisprudence is disgraceful. 110
109 See McLain v. City of Chicago, 127 I1. App. 489, 491 (1906). "The purpose of
the statute in relation to evidence . . . is only to remove the common law disability and
allow witnesses to testify who were thereby excluded. It neither directly nor by implication
enlarges or diminishes the class of cases wherein convictions discredit the witness."
110 Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 CmI. B. RECORD 303, 307 (1961).
